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Abstract
Using a new model of markets in regulated open access resources, we illustrate the evolution of a fishery as
demand for the product grows.  We show that increased demand for fish in its fresh form shortens the
fishing season and leads to the development of a market for processed fish.  The model allows us to
calculate the rent gains from rationalizing the fishery, and we show that much of the rent gains come on the
market side as the season lengthens and more fish can be delivered to the higher-valued fresh market.2
1. INTRODUCTION
It is probably not an exaggeration to state that resource economists have been mostly preoccupied
with the production and cost structure of resource industries, to the relative exclusion of the market
structure.  In renewable resource economics, this “bias” may actually reflect the long intellectual influence
of H.S. Gordon's [10] foundational paper on open access exploitation published in 1954.  That paper laid out
the theory of open access exploitation, but within a structure that purposefully ignored many of the
complexities of real world fisheries.  One of the assumptions made by Gordon was that prices were fixed,
implying no feedback into or from the market as a fishery evolved from under-exploited to over-exploited
conditions.
Over the nearly fifty years since Gordon's paper appeared, fisheries economists have focused
primarily on the normative issues he raised, the most significant of which is that open access is socially
wasteful, since resource rents will be dissipated by over-capacity and excessive application of inputs.  This
focus on the production or input side of the system led fisheries economists to propose an extensive array of
policies such as limited entry programs and individual transferable quota (ITQ) programs, intended to tackle
this problem of “too many inputs chasing too few fish.”  The most dramatic changes in fisheries have
occurred under ITQ programs, the first of which began to appear in the early 1980s.  To date there are over
sixty of these programs in existence (OECD, [11]), and important empirical evidence is beginning to
accumulate on how significant rent dissipation is, and what kinds of efficiency-improving methods are
adopted once stakeholders have a property right to the resource.
Perhaps the biggest surprise emerging in the empirical evidence from rationalizing fisheries is that
the first kinds of changes adopted more often reflect alterations in the attributes of the product rather than
reductions in costs or inputs per se.
1  While some capacity reduction generally takes place, and some inputs
are reconfigured eventually, it is more often the case that revenues rise immediately in response to changes
in fishing practices that deliver higher valued raw products to new market niches previously under-served
under open access conditions.  This market-side reservoir of potential rent gains was not generally expected3
by economists, perhaps because our view of the rent dissipation process was so closely colored by Gordon's
exclusive focus on excessive (production) inputs.
To better understand the role of markets in the rent dissipation process, this paper develops a
relatively simple model of markets under regulated open access conditions.  As has been argued elsewhere,
H. S. Gordon's depiction of  pure open access fisheries popularized in his 1954 paper (and subsequently by
Garrett Hardin's work) has become largely obsolete since the extension of jurisdiction in 1976. Since then,
most fisheries have come under the auspices of some national or multi-lateral regulatory body and hence are
no longer subject to pure open access conditions. The manner in which a fishery evolves is thus no longer
determined mainly by the interaction of unrestrained effort and biological capacity.  Instead, what unfolds in
modern fisheries is largely influenced by the nature of the goals of the regulatory agency, the regulatory
instruments used, and the responsiveness of fishermen to those regulations.  As has been argued recently, a
different paradigm is needed to depict modern fisheries, one that gives proper recognition to the role of the
regulatory sector as a determinant of the outcome under new regulated open access institutional regimes.
2
In this paper, we further develop this theme, by adding a market to a model of joint
industry/regulator interaction.  This enables us to accomplish two tasks.  The first is that we are able to
characterize how changes in the market affect the regulated equilibrium.  For example, we can depict how
income- and population-induced growth of markets has influenced the level of over-capacity and the
stringency of regulatory instruments in regulated fisheries.  Second, we can also characterize how the
institutional structure of regulated open access fisheries has, itself, affected the development and emergence
of particular market niches.  Hence we can show, for example, mechanisms by which most of the raw
product in a regulated open access fishery will be diverted into lower valued product markets rather than
higher valued markets.  This gives us some new insights into exactly how the market-side rents that are
currently being unlocked by ITQs were originally dissipated.
In the next section, we develop a model of exvessel price determination in a regulated open access
fishery.  The market equilibrium in this setting is complicated for several reasons.  First, the harvesting
season length (and conversely the length of the processed (frozen) product marketing period) is determined4
endogenously.  Regulators set season lengths to ensure stock safety, but based on expected capacity
committed by the industry.  The capacity chosen by industry, in turn, is based partly on expected exvessel
prices, which are determined by the manner in which the whole marketing year is divided up between a fresh
market and a frozen market period.  Exvessel prices also must reflect relative demand conditions during the
fresh market period and derived demand for additions to inventories.  The derived demand for inventories
must also reflect expectations of the market for processed product to be supplied out of storage for the
remainder of the marketing year.  Hence in the final analysis, total capacity, the harvesting season length, the
period over which fresh fish are sold, the period over which frozen fish are sold, exvessel price paths, and
inventory market price paths are all determined endogenously.
2.  A MODEL OF MARKETS IN A REGULATED OPEN ACCESS FISHERY
In this model, the fishing industry is assumed to commit a fixed level of harvesting capacity, E, for
the upcoming season.  The regulatory authority sets the fishing season length, τ , in order to ensure that the
total harvest over the season does not exceed a predetermined total allowable catch (TAC). Whole fish are
landed throughout the fishing season and fishermen are paid an exvessel price
EV
t P .  As the raw product is
landed, it is allocated into either the fresh wholesale market or into the frozen wholesale market or both.
Inventory accumulation for the frozen market may start at the outset of the harvest season (time 0), or may
be delayed until later in the season.  Once the harvest season is over (at time τ ), the inventory can be sold as
frozen fish until the end of the inventory dissipation period, T.  The beginning and ending dates of the
marketing year (0 and T) are assumed to be exogenous, but the length of the inventory accumulation period
and the length of the harvest season are endogenously determined.   Fishing capacity (E) and the wholesale
price that prevails in the frozen market at the end of the marketing period (
Z
T P ) are also determined within
the model.5
2.1   Industry Behavior
Firms are assumed to commit to a certain level of capacity, E, for the season.  Harvest, H, is
modeled as a standard density-dependent Schaefer production function of capacity and biomass, X:
t t qEX H = .  Since harvest depletes the biomass by the amount of harvest, the equation governing biomass
depletion during the season is
3: . t qEX X − = ￿   Integrating this equation, noting that biomass at the beginning
of the season is X0, we get:
qEt
t e X X 0 = .  Now, harvest in any period t will be:
. 0
qEt
t e qEX H
− =    (1)
Note that harvest declines as the season progresses due to the reduction in biomass resulting from fishing.
In an open access setting, the capacity level is determined by the assumption that the entry proceeds
until total harvest rents anticipated over the whole season are dissipated.  We write the expression for
discounted seasonal rents as:
fE dt vE H P e t
EV
t








t P is the exvessel price at time t, v is the daily variable cost of employing capacity and f is the fixed
seasonal cost of participation per unit of capacity.  Substituting in the expression for harvest and setting
profits equal to zero, we get:









This equation determines (implicitly) the rent dissipating level of capacity, given other parameters and
endogenous variables including the season length τ .
2.2 Regulator  Behavior
We assume that regulators establish a total allowable catch (TAC) for the season, based upon a stock
sustainability criterion.  They then set the season length to achieve that goal in the face of capacity
expectations.
4  The season length will thus depend upon the amount of capacity in the fishery; with less6
capacity, a longer season may be allowed than with more capacity.  Since regulators know the production
function of the fishery, or that total harvest over the season will be
) 1 ( 0  0
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The above is the basic regulated open access model as discussed in Homans and Wilen [16], with the simple
addition of a time varying path for exvessel prices.  In the sections below, we close the model by discussing
various ways to solve the equilibrium exvessel price path under a variety of assumptions about the market.
2.3  The Market-Fresh Only
Assume, for the time being, that the only market outlet for raw fish is to sell them into a fresh
wholesale market.  In this case, fishermen deliver raw fish to a daily market, where they are paid an exvessel
price 
EV
t P .   The raw fish are then immediately resold, after a moderate amount of conversion, into a fresh
wholesale market.  Before proceeding, we need to reconcile the units of measurement in both the exvessel
and wholesale markets.  Generally, exvessel prices are paid for fish at the dock and are paid per pound of
dressed (headed and gutted) fish.  In contrast, wholesale prices are usually for partially processed fish
(trimmed and partially butchered).  We thus need to introduce a conversion or product loss factor to account
for differences in the units of the product at the two levels of the market chain.  For simplicity, we assume
that an exvessel-to-wholesale conversion factor of k applies, so that each pound of landed weight converts
into k pounds of wholesale quantity, Q
F (fresh).  For example, if the conversion factor is .65, each pound of
dressed weight will be converted into .65 pounds of wholesale weight.  Alternatively, to obtain one pound of
wholesale product, we need (1/.65)=1.54 pounds of landed weight.
5
 How will the market clear under these simplified circumstances?  Since only fresh fish are
marketed during the open harvest season, we can use the conversion factor and the expression for harvest7
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For tractability we specify an isoelastic instantaneous wholesale demand function for fresh fish:




t P B Q . (6)
Then, we can insert the periodic exvessel supply equation (5) into the demand function (equation (6)) and,

















This is the within-season equilibrium wholesale price path.  It is upward sloping since the quantity of fish
landed falls as the biomass is depleted during the season.  Note that the rate of increase of prices is qE/β , so
that a fishery with more effort and a higher catchability coefficient will experience more steeply rising prices
within the season than a fishery with low effort and/or catchability.  Note also that the effort level itself is an
endogenous variable that depends upon exvessel prices rather than wholesale prices.  In this simplified
model, exvessel prices can be found by multiplying the wholesale price by the conversion factor: P
EV=kP
F,




















t .( 7 )
These exvessel prices can be inserted into the rent dissipation equation (2) and, in combination with the
regulatory decision rule in (4), we have two equations [(2) and (4)] to determine two unknowns [E and
  τ ].   Ι n a regulated open access fishery in which the entire harvest is allocated into the fresh market, total
exvessel demand over the season will equal the TAC, and the equilibrium price path that emerges will be
just high enough to induce the correspondingly correct amount of capacity to harvest exactly the targeted
amount over the allowed season length τ , all with zero rents.8
2.4  The Market--Fresh and Frozen
The above scenario is straightforward and only a modest extension of the basic regulated open
access model.  But the implications of including a more realistic depiction of the market are more profound
than in this simple model.  In particular, when we close the open access model with a market sector, it
becomes clear that the market is an important engine for the rent dissipation process.
6  As the market grows,
for example, more effort will be attracted to the fishery.  This implies, in turn, that regulators will have to
constrict seasons (or tighten other efficiency stifling regulations) in order to ensure that the TAC is not
exceeded.  Thus over the long run, a fishery like the one depicted here is likely to find itself backed into a
shorter and shorter season.  This is, in fact, what we see in many regulated open access fisheries.  The classic
example is the North Pacific Halibut fishery that was reduced to five-day seasons by the end of the 1980s.
This case is not isolated; other examples with artificially short seasons include sablefish, salmon, and roe
herring on the West Coast, and Chesapeake Bay oysters, and clams and quahogs on the East Coast.  The
phenomenon of increasingly compressed seasons was not predicted by the Gordon model since he ignored
both market complexities and regulations in his simple open access model.
A second important implication of this depiction of regulated open access with markets is that we
would expect alternative processed markets to develop in response to shortening seasons.  Thus in a
paradoxical way, as the fresh market grows with income and population growth, prices will rise, effort will
be attracted, and the season will shrink, opening up enhanced opportunities for markets that ultimately
substitute for the fresh market.  This is also what we see in many regulated open access fisheries; namely a
gradual conversion of the fishery from one serving exclusively a fresh market to one serving (almost
exclusively) a frozen or otherwise processed market.  In the Halibut fishery for example, virtually all fish
was sold fresh over a season that lasted close to a full calendar year in the early part of the century.  After a
regulatory structure was introduced in 1930, seasons began to steadily shorten.  By the 1950s over 80% of
the product was sold into the frozen wholesale market, and by the 1980s virtually all halibut were frozen.
Modeling the possibility of a frozen or otherwise processed product adds considerable complexity to
the regulated open access model.  This is because, unlike the case with fresh fish, the daily market for frozen9
fish must clear according to stock and flow demands for an inventory market.  With inventories of a stored
product, we can divide a typical year into a harvest season and an inventory dissipation period.  In order to
accumulate inventories of frozen fish to sell after the season closes, inventory holders must begin buying
fish to store during the harvesting period.  This implies that the exvessel market will be influenced by the
joint willingness to pay of both fresh and frozen fish wholesalers.  Figure 1 shows one possible
configuration of harvesting and marketing activities during a typical season.  As the figure is drawn, there is
an initial fresh phase during which all of the harvested fish are sold into a fresh market.  This occurs until
period s, at which time some of the harvest is added to inventory in an accumulation phase for later sales
after the season is closed.  During the period between s and τ , raw fish are bid for by wholesalers serving
both the fresh market and the market for additions to inventory.  At the end of the harvest season at time τ ,
there is a third dissipation phase in which the frozen market is served out of accumulated inventories, a
period which lasts until the end of the inventory dissipation period, T.
In the following sections, we characterize the price and quantity paths that emerge in each of the
three possible marketing phases.  In particular, we need to find the exvessel price path in the fresh and
accumulation phases in order to express the zero rent equation (equation (2)) in terms of the four
endogenous variables.  We do this by deriving equilibrium exvessel prices that reflect the seasonal
wholesale demands for fish, in both the fresh market and the market for inventory.  These prices reflect the
elimination of arbitrage opportunities between wholesalers buying for fresh and frozen markets during the
fishing season, and also among wholesalers selling inventoried fish after the season is completed.
2.4.1 The Fresh Phase
As discussed above, in the phase in which all harvest flows into the fresh fish market, the wholesale
and exvessel price paths increase since harvest is declining as the season progresses. Since the entire harvest
flows into the fresh market in this phase, we know that total exvessel demand for fresh fish must equal total
supply, or the integral of the equation for harvest (equation (1)), between 0 and s:
) 1 ( 0 1
qEs F e X D
− − = . (8)10
2.4.2 The Accumulation Phase
We define the accumulation phase as one in which harvest is allocated simultaneously to the fresh
wholesale market for immediate sale and to the frozen wholesale market for storage and subsequent sales.
7
The exvessel price path is then determined by competition between fresh market wholesalers and frozen
market wholesalers.  In equilibrium, the exvessel price path in the accumulation phase will partially reflect
the same markdown of wholesale fresh prices as in (7) above.  Importantly, however, the exvessel price path
will reflect the shadow value path of additions to inventory, which depends on the plans of inventory holders
in the competitive frozen wholesale market.  In an inventory equilibrium, inventory holders must be
indifferent between selling their stored product at any time during the post-season marketing period.  In
addition, their willingness to pay during the accumulation phase buying period should reflect their expected
sales prices during the post-season marketing period and costs of storage.  For simplicity, we ignore holding
costs other than the opportunity cost of inventories.
8  Under these assumptions, in order for buyers to be
willing to buy and hold stocks of inventory, they must anticipate that the net wholesale price will rise at a
rate to cover their opportunity costs.  This implies that the wholesale frozen price 
Z P  must rise
exponentially, or
Z Z rP P = ￿ ,
where r is the discount rate.  Integrating this equation from t to T yields the price path that must emerge in
the wholesale market for frozen fish:
) ( t T r Z
T
Z
t e P P
− − = .( 9 )
where
Z
T P is the choke price, or price in the last period in the marketing period.  Prices must follow this path
from the start of the inventory accumulation period (s in Figure 1) to the end of the inventory dissipation
period, T, in order for wholesalers to be willing to hold some raw product in inventory for later sales.
Between s and τ , the shadow prices for additions to inventory must follow the same path whereas after τ ,
inventory holders will receive these actual prices in the wholesale market for frozen fish.  The exvessel price
path, then, will be a markdown of the net wholesale shadow price path
9:11





t e kP kP P
− − = = . (10)
During the accumulation phase, wholesalers in the fresh market must also offer a competitive price
in order to obtain raw fish to serve the fresh market.   If they offer an exvessel price below that offered by
wholesalers purchasing for inventory, they will be unable to operate in the market.  If wholesalers in the
fresh market can offer an exvessel price above that determined by the inventory shadow price, then they will
be able to purchase the entire harvest for the fresh market.  In an arbitrage equilibrium in the accumulation
phase in which both fresh and frozen wholesalers are participating, the exvessel price paid by fresh market
wholesalers must equal the exvessel price paid by accumulators of inventory, and the net wholesale price for
fresh fish will equal the net wholesale price for frozen fish:
) ( /
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This is the cumulative fresh wholesale demand, given that fresh wholesalers must pay the same price that
inventory holders are paying during the accumulation phase [s,τ ]. Converting this into landed weight by
















− − − = 2 . (12)
The remainder of the harvest in this phase is sold into inventory and becomes inventory supply, destined for
the frozen wholesale market.12
2.4.3 The Dissipation Phase
During the final phase, from τ  to T, there is no harvesting since the season is closed and the
inventory is sold until it is fully depleted.
10  Periodic wholesale demand for frozen fish is also assumed to be
isoelastic:
α − = ) (
Z Z P A Q .
Since prices follow equation (9), the frozen sales path is given by:
[]
α − − − =
) ( t T r Z
T
Z
t e P A Q
Total wholesale demand for frozen inventory is calculated by integrating this quantity between τ  and T:
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2.3.4 Inventory Supply and Demand
The total supply of raw fish placed in inventory in the accumulation phase must equal the demand
for inventory over the subsequent marketing or dissipation period.  The supply of fish added to inventory is
equal to the total supply of fish over the harvesting season (equation (3)) less total fresh demand in both the
fresh and accumulation phases (equations (8) and (12)):
F F qE Z D D e X S 2 1 0 ) 1 ( − − − =
− τ .
Demand for inventory is 
Z D3 , given in equation (13).  Therefore, the inventory-clearing equation that must
be satisfied is that 
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2.4 Equilibrium
Now that expressions for the exvessel price paths in both phases have been developed, we can
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which, when integrated out gives us:
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This zero rent equation, together with the inventory clearing equation (14), and the regulator equilibrium
equation (4) gives us three equations, expressed in terms of four unknowns: E, s, τ , and 
Z
T P .  The remaining
equation is determined by relating the choke price to an arbitrage condition that must hold at either the
beginning or the end of the inventory accumulation period.
There are two qualitatively different scenarios possible, depending upon whether the equilibrium
price path for fresh fish rises faster or slower than the discount rate.  Recall that the fresh fish price path rises
at a rate qE/β .  If this rate (with the equilibrium effort level) is smaller than r, then the shadow price path of
inventory will cross the fresh fish wholesale price from below.  Under these conditions, the market will be
characterized by an exclusively fresh phase, an accumulation phase with both fresh and frozen inventory
buyers, and then a dissipation phase, in that order.  This pattern is the case that is developed above in
equations (8)-(16) and it is illustrated in Figure 2.  As Figure 2 shows, fresh wholesaler buyers can outbid
frozen wholesalers during the first phase.  In the second (accumulation) phase, inventory buyers pay the
shadow price of additions to inventory and some raw product goes into each of the fresh and frozen
markets.
11    To the equilibrium equations  (4), (14), and (15), we add:
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which enables us to find s, or the date at which inventory accumulation begins.  This equation requires that
the exvessel price paid by fresh market wholesalers for the last unit purchased in the exclusively fresh phase
is just equal to the price paid for the first unit of raw product purchased for inventory.
The other pattern of market sequences arises when the fresh fish market price rises faster than the
discount rate, in which case the shadow price path for inventory will cross the fresh fish price from above as
in Figure 3.  In this scenario, the market will be characterized by a pattern involving an accumulation phase
in which raw fish are allocated to both wholesale markets, an exclusively fresh phase, and a dissipation
phase, in that order.  In this case, frozen wholesalers establish the price in the first (accumulation) phase and
some raw product is allocated to both fresh and frozen wholesale markets.  Buyers for the fresh market must
pay the inventory shadow price; again the dotted line shows what they could pay if all landings were
devoted to the fresh market (at the equilibrium effort level).  In the second phase, fresh wholesale buyers can
pay more than the shadow price of inventory and hence they receive all the raw product.  The lighter black
line indicates the amount frozen wholesalers could pay, but they are outbid in the second phase.
12  The
analytics of this scenario require straightforward modifications in (14) and (15), and then (16) gives the date
s at which the accumulation period ends
13.  A priori, it is difficult to tell which sequence of markets should
prevail in any situation.  Different combinations of parameters will lead to different qualitative scenarios.
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Thus we turn in the next section to a calibration to conditions in the North Pacific Halibut fishery based on
explicit parameters drawn from various sources.
3.  AN APPLICATION:  THE NORTH PACIFIC HALIBUT FISHERY
The system developed above to describe the workings of the exvessel and wholesale markets in a
regulated open access fishery is complicated and difficult to examine using simple analytical methods such
as comparative statics.  In particular, there are several kinds of qualitative equilibria possible, with a range of
interior (and corner) solution outcomes depending upon parameters in the harvesting, regulator, and
marketing components.  Moreover, the regime and the order of the marketing, accumulation and dissipation
phases depends upon which of two regimes one is in, and the equilibrium regime is itself endogenous.15
In order to explore some of the model’s predictions, we calibrate it using parameters drawn from
data and analysis of the North Pacific Halibut Fishery.  This fishery has been described and analyzed
elsewhere, but the important point for our purposes is that it fits the structure outlined in the model presented
here almost exactly.  First, it has been managed from 1930 until very recently primarily with season length
controls.  Second, regulators set TACs on a year-to-year basis in accordance with implicit and explicit goals
designed to ensure that the biomass is kept at a safe level.  Third, the market consists primarily of a fresh and
a frozen market. In the frozen market, raw fish are inventoried and removed during the marketing season and
sold into higher levels of the marketing chain.
The halibut fishery has exhibited a long history of interesting and hitherto relatively unexplored
interactions between the market and the fishery.
15  During the early periods of the fishery’s development
(1890-1920), the fishery was conducted year long under completely open access conditions and most fish
were sold into local fresh and moderately processed markets.  In the 1920s, rail completions and refrigerated
shipping opened up eastern markets and resultant high prices continued to draw in effort and deplete stocks.
After a decade of negotiation, the U.S. and Canada agreed in 1930 to jointly manage the fishery, using
scientifically determined TACs designed to rebuild the stocks to healthy levels.  The success of the
rebuilding program attracted entry throughout the 1930-1960 period, and this was met with steadily reduced
season lengths, falling to less than two months in the 1950s.  During the 1960s and 1970s, world demand for
fish boomed, fueling price increases and pressures on most stocks, regulated or not.  In the halibut fishery,
frozen markets continued to expand, fueling further effort increases and further shortening of the seasons.
By the 1970s, markets had strengthened and capacity has risen so dramatically that harvesting seasons had
been reduced to a week or less.
Using data described in the Appendix, we calibrated our conceptual model to illuminate some of the
history of the halibut fishery.  The simulations reported simulate the role of the evolution of market forces
that served as prime drivers of the steady and self-reinforcing progression of the fishery into the final stages
of the 1970s.  Table I shows a regulated open access fishery in its very early stages, characterized by a
reasonably long season, modest amounts of effort, and an exclusively fresh market.  In the first row, the16
fresh market is of modest size and the rent dissipating capacity is just enough to catch the TAC in a twelve-
month period.  As the fishery matures, markets are developed and there is growth of the fresh market, driven
by income and population growth and transportation/handling innovations.  These changes are depicted by a
shift in the wholesale demand curve, the implications of which can be seen in subsequent rows.
16   The result
of this evolution of the market is predicted by the simulations, so that as fresh demand rises, exvessel prices
also rise, attracting more effort to dissipate the potential rents that grow as the market expands.  Unlike the
pure open access Gordon model (which would predict a lower open access biomass level with higher prices),
the regulated open access model predicts that biomass remains fixed by regulatory actions while the primary
effects are displayed in growing capacity and a season length that progressively falls over time.
At some point in this pattern of effort growth and shorter seasons, it becomes profitable for a
wholesale processed market to emerge.  In particular, with a larger and larger fraction of the year left with
no fish as the fresh market is compressed, it eventually pays to buy fish for storage and sales during the post-
season period.  Table II depicts this scenario by a gradual shift of wholesale frozen demand.  We assume that
frozen demand is more elastic than fresh demand, and that the market is initially dominated by the existing
strong fresh market.
17  But as marketers focus attention on building the frozen market, the demand for frozen
increases.  As can be seen in Table II, this opens up an inventory market in which some raw product is
stored for later sale.  The parameters of the halibut case generate a sequence of markets in which there is an
accumulation phase in which both fresh and inventory wholesalers buy raw product as soon as the season
opens.  For example, in  the second row, inventory accumulation takes place until period 1.79, at which time
inventory wholesalers can no longer compete against fresh buyers.  The exclusively fresh market then lasts
from period 1.79 until the end of the season at 3.46, at which time the frozen product is dissipated out of
inventory.  With such a small frozen market initially, most of the important market activity is still in the
fresh market; 98.48% of the harvest is sold fresh, split roughly evenly between the accumulation phase and
the exclusive fresh phase.  As the frozen market begins to grow, exvessel prices rise, effort is attracted, and
the season length is reduced.
18  At some point (here when the scale parameter for the frozen market reaches17
0.5) the whole season is characterized by an accumulation phase in which both fresh and frozen buyers are
buying in an arbitrage equilibrium.
Over the long run, the frozen market continues to grow, fueled by population and income growth
and market development.  This market growth leads to a continuation of the process exhibited during the all-
fresh market phase, namely a situation in which the season length is progressively shortened as the new
market grows.  Hence we see, for example, the season dropping from three to two and finally to one month
as more and more effort is attracted.  By the time the frozen market has reached the stage depicted in the
final row, the bulk (74.09%) of the raw product is frozen, stored, and dissipated out over a marketing period
that lasts nearly a year (10.27 months).  This mechanism thus reveals another mostly ignored source of rent
dissipation associated with open access.  In particular, even when fresh markets yield higher wholesale
prices, ceteris paribus, the evolutionary forces associated with market growth sow the seeds of their own
destruction in a regulated open access fishery.  In the early phases, as fresh markets grow, they induce
regulatory counter-reactions (shorter seasons) that open up preconditions for markets for processed
commodities that may be inherently inferior uses of the raw product.  The process is self-reinforcing, since
shorter seasons cause more marketing resources to be shifted into processed market development, hastening
the constriction of the season.  Eventually, with very short seasons, most of the product must be allocated to
the frozen market, even if it would yield more revenues when spread over a longer period in the fresh
markets.
In summary, the analytical model and the simulations developed here depict both the qualitative and
the quantitative forces at work in the halibut fishery over the last 70 years to a reasonable level of accuracy.
More generally, the model shows mechanisms by which the market both drives and reacts to changes in a
regulated open access fishery. As we have demonstrated, market growth drives the rent dissipation process
by raising prices and bidding up raw product values.  But when effort enters a regulated open access fishery,
it will be met by regulatory reactions, and these may influence the impact of market growth and set the
process off in new path-dependent directions.  For example, as fresh markets grow, they will attract entry
and force regulators to restrict the season.  But as the season is reduced, the window opens for the evolution18
and development of processed markets.  Processed markets may then take over as drivers of the system in a
self-reinforcing spiral towards the ultimate absurdity witnessed in many modern fisheries, namely an intense
artificially short season in which all the product must of necessity be devoted to lower end value processed
uses.  This product conversion to low valued end uses is thus another source of rent dissipation associated
with open access.  Since market losses have been largely ignored by most fisheries economists, it is not clear
how the magnitude of these kinds of losses compare with the excessive production input losses that Gordon
focused on in his influential 1954 article.  It is likely, however, that we are underestimating the potential
waste from open access by focusing exclusively on production efficiency losses.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Among natural resource economists generally, and among those who study renewable resources
specifically, there has not been much attention paid to resource output markets.
19  This is in contrast to what
we see in agricultural economics, where there is a long-standing tradition of more evenly balanced interest in
production and marketing topics related to food production.  We have suggested a reason for this in the case
of fisheries economics; namely an intellectual tradition heavily influenced by H. S. Gordon's early paper on
open access exploitation, which downplayed the market in order to focus on distortions in production inputs
and output supplies
Whatever the reasons for the lack of formal attention, the relative neglect of the output market in
studies of renewable resource systems has led to some important misreading of market failures, some
incomplete or even faulty policy advice, and probably some misapplication of intellectual energy.  As we
have pointed out, by missing the importance of the output market to the rent dissipation problem in fisheries,
we have failed to appreciate exactly what has been happening in the important test cases of fisheries
rationalization with individual transferable quotas (ITQs).  Much of the initial rent generation in these cases
has emerged from reconfigured product markets rather than reconfigured input combinations.  Whether this
will generalize across many fisheries is an interesting question, as is the question of whether, in the long run,19
input cost saving rents will catch up to output market rents.  But what is needed, and what we take a first cut
at in this paper, is a clearer depiction of how markets operate in regulated open access settings.
The model presented here is very stylized, in the sense that the fishing technology, regulatory
structure, and market are all depicted under simplified assumptions.  The only regulatory instrument
assumed in play is the choice of season length, and the only two markets are a fresh and frozen market.  At
the same time, these assumptions are mostly adequate to cover a large fraction of the world's fisheries.  They
also illustrate the manner in which regulations, technology, industry behavior, and market structure
simultaneously affect the structure and evolution of fisheries.
Our results show why we observe many of the most important and valuable fisheries backed into a
situation of extreme excess capacity, short seasons, and inferior products, even in the face of worldwide
growth in protein demand.  In particular, the growth in output markets provides the engine for rent
dissipation, which ultimately manifests itself in both wasted inputs and inferior output product mix.  The
model predicts that, over time, an increasing fraction of raw product will be devoted to processed products.
The mechanism for this is subtle, because it is partly driven by regulatory reactions to increased fishing
capacity.  As exvessel prices rise, capacity enters, and this capacity must be stifled by shortening the season.
Shorter seasons, in turn, reduce the opportunity to sell into the fresh market and increase the need to hold
raw product in inventory to sell into inferior markets later in the year.  This is a positive prediction, of
course, with normative implications related to the social welfare losses due to the waste.  But it also suggests
some hypotheses about where we might expect to find large market losses vis a vis excess capacity costs.
In addition, the model can be used to show what can happen once a regulated open access resource
is rationalized with an instrument like ITQs.  It is possible to run the model "backward" from the end point
of the scenarios in Tables I and II depicting regulated open access equilibria with short seasons.  Suppose
that property rights are created by dividing the TAC into ITQs and distributing them to original participants.
In this case, the harvesting season length would almost immediately stretch to the full year, and quota
holders would plan the timing of harvests over the year to achieve the highest possible exvessel prices.  If
this can be achieved by allocating a more even and smaller average monthly flow to the fresh market, then20
raw product would be diverted from frozen to fresh markets.  This, in fact, happened almost immediately in
British Columbia when their portion of the halibut fishery came under ITQs in 1993.
20   For the parameters
we use in the simulations here, Table III shows what is predicted to happen.  We begin with the regulated
open access conditions depicted in the final row of Table II, in which the fishery has attracted 85 thousand
units of gear, operating over a season of less than 2 months, selling 74% of the product out of inventory as a
frozen commodity.  As can be seen, there are two important consequences of rationalization.  The first is as
predicted by Gordon, namely a reduction in the need for the excessive inputs attracted under open access.
We see, for example, total discounted yearly input costs falling from 93 million dollars to 20 million dollars,
mainly through a reduction in redundant fixed costs associated with excessive vessels.  Variable costs fall
slightly, but the total variable costs represent costs associated with fewer units being used over a longer
period.  The other important consequence of  rationalization is the gain in revenues,  as the  raw product is
diverted back into the more valuable fresh market.  With the parameters used here, the estimated market
gains are associated with revenues rising from 93 million to 174 million dollars annually.  Importantly, the
gains in market rents are equal or even slightly larger in size relative to the cost savings induced by input
reduction.
The initial “impact effect” of rationalization no doubt understates the longer term effect because we
would likely see new development of fresh marketing niches, essentially re-creating opportunities in the
fresh market that would have been dormant under short seasons.  This occurred when British Columbia
adopted ITQs in their halibut fishery in 1993.  Prior to ITQs, the BC halibut fishery was conducted over a
five-day season, with most fish sold into frozen inventory and parceled out over the subsequent marketing
season.  Interviews with marketers after ITQs were adopted revealed that the fresh market network grew as
wholesalers opened up new sales opportunities for fresh fish that had never been served before.  As one
wholesaler put it: “when ITQs were first adopted, fresh fish prices would drop dramatically as soon as
100,000 pounds per week were landed.  After two years, however, the fresh fish market could absorb
800,000 pounds per week before prices began to drop.”21
This kind of innovation in the product market in response to rationalization makes it even more
difficult for analysts to forecast what might happen under discrete changes in property rights.  The task is
more difficult because fishing technology choice and the market are inextricably intertwined.  For example,
when New Zealand converted its mixed inshore trawl fisheries to species-specific ITQs in the 1980s, some
fishermen completely switched gear types and fishing practices in order to access new market opportunities
made possible by the slower-paced fishery.  The snapper fishery is an oft-cited example in which fishermen
holding rights switched away from trawl toward long line gear.  This was done in order to target certain
sizes to sell into the lucrative Japanese live fish trade and fishermen reportedly were able to triple their
revenues.  Interestingly, however, it is generally more costly to harvest with long line gear.  This kind of
change in response to rationalization would be completely missed if one were expecting, a la H.S.Gordon, a
simple decrease in inputs in response to rationalization.
 If there is any central lesson to be learned from these kinds of empirical cases it is that naïve
extrapolations based on, for example, econometric estimation of technology in use before rationalization
may be inappropriate for forecasting the kinds of changes we might expect under discrete changes in
property rights.  When one considers that market rent dissipation may be just as important as input
inefficiencies in conditioning technology and behavior, it becomes clear that the unraveling of a system
bound up by controls and distortions can take unanticipated turns.  An analyst trying to forecast the impacts
of implementation of ITQs in New Zealand, for example, might wade in armed with data and flexible
functional forms and sophisticated duality models that fit mixed trawl fisheries in hindsight just fine, only to
discover that there are no trawl fisheries remaining after ITQs.  These kinds of discrete process shifts are
difficult to forecast under any circumstances, of course.  What this paper suggests is that analysts ought to be
aware of the possibility as regulated open access fisheries are rationalized, because rent dissipation and
distortions on the marketing side of the ledger may be as important as distortions on the production or cost
side of the ledger.
Table I: Market Exclusively Fresh





1.66 12.00 12.21 0.34 0.39
2 10.71 13.69 0.36 0.41
3 8.41 17.42 0.42 0.48
4 7.13 20.58 0.47 0.54
5 6.28 23.35 0.51 0.59
10 4.29 34.16 0.68 0.78
15 3.46 42.38 0.81 0.93






























15 0 0.00 3.46 42.38 0.81 0.926 0.00% 100.00% 1.05
15 0.1 1.79 3.43 42.72 0.85 0.919 1.52% 46.72% 1.10
15 0.2 2.51 3.40 43.06 0.86 0.912 2.99% 25.68% 1.11
15 0.3 3.05 3.38 43.41 0.87 0.906 4.44% 9.53% 1.12
15 0.5 3.32 3.32 44.10 0.88 0.909 7.30% 0% 1.14
15 5 2.35 2.35 62.28 1.18 1.211 52.38% 0% 1.53
15 10 1.73 1.73 84.81 1.56 1.586 74.09% 0% 2.0223
Table III: Rents Under Rationalization
Optimal Regulated Open Access
Fixed Costs 12.22 84.81
Variable Costs 8.29 8.72





Biomass 440 Implied equilibrium biomass from the quota rule target,
combining Areas 2 and 3.  Homans and Wilen [16]
Quota 60 Implied equilibrium quota from the quota rule target,
combining Areas 2 and 3.  Homans and Wilen [16]
Fixed Cost (F) 1 Estimated fixed cost for Area 2 Homans and Wilen [16]
Variable Cost (V) 0.06 Estimated variable cost for Area 2.  Homans and Wilen
[16]
Frozen Elasticity (α ) 1.5 Herrmann [14] has an import own-price elasticity of 1.68.
Homans and Wilen [16] estimate 1.16 at the means
Fresh Elasticity (β ) 1.1
Catchability Coefficient (q) 0.001 Estimated catchability coefficient for Area 2.  Homans
and Wilen [16]
Discount Rate (r) 0.01 Implied monthly discount rate, from a 12% annual
discount rate
Conversion Factor (k) 0.87 Reported conversion factor from dressed weight (headed
and gutted) to blocks, fillets, and steaks (Dept. of
Commerce [23])24
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Wholesale Price Path: Late Fresh Scenario29
ENDNOTES
                                                       
1 For example, Casey et. al. [2] report that in the British Columbia halibut fishery, the season lengthened from 5 days to
8 months after ITQs.  As a result, wholesalers were able to sell 94% fresh after ITQs compared with 42% before, and
exvessel prices rose over 50% in the first couple of years.   Geen and Nayar [7], reporting on the Australian Southern
Bluefin Tuna, conclude that prices doubled from about AUS$988 to AUS$2000 per metric ton within three years of the
ITQ program’s inception.  This occurred as fishermen switched from targeting small tuna in nearshore regions to larger
more mature tuna off the continental shelf.  Before ITQs only 13% of tuna were greater than 15kg.; 2 years after ITQs
the percentage had risen above 35%.  In Iceland, Arnason [ 1] reports that a 1985 study conducted soon after ITQs were
adopted showed benefits from reduced effort worth US$14 million from effort reduction and US$6 from improved
product quality.    Gauvin et. al. [6] reported two years after the wreckfish fishery converted to ITQs that prices had
risen to about $1.85 per pound with considerably more stability from pre-ITQ levels fluctuating between $0.90-1.55.
Their interviews with processors confirmed that this was due to the elimination of supply gluts and the practice of
dumping raw product into less valuable frozen and discount supermarket outlets.
2 Homans and Wilen [16].
3 For analytical simplicity, we ignore natural mortality, although the qualitative conclusions would not be affected by
including it.  In addition, this model is a within-season model and hence we ignore between-season dynamics.  Homans
and Wilen [16] discuss the approach path in a fully dynamic regulated open access model.
4 For simplicity, we ignore the determination of the TAC in this paper.  Homans and Wilen [16] discuss how regulatory
agencies typically choose a TAC in order to maintain biomass at some “safe” level.  We also ignore the complications
that would be introduced by making the model stochastic.  In the model presented here, we assume a deterministic
world in which the equilibrium is reached by some tatonnement process.  Alternatively, we could assume that the
equilibrium is reached with each player operating in a Nash setting, forming expectations of the other’s actions, etc.
Again, the qualitative conclusions are not changed appreciably by alternative and more complicated equilibrium
mechanisms.30
                                                                                                                                                                                      
5 Conversions losses explain part of the often contentious differences between prices received by harvesters (or
farmers) and prices received by first wholesalers and others in the marketing chain.  Even if there were no costs of
conversion, wholesalers would need (in the above example) to get $1.54 per pound of wholesale product for every
$1.00 they paid fishermen for dressed raw product, simply to cover conversion losses.  If there are conversion and other
marketing costs between links in the chain the differences would be even larger.
6 The other primary engine in the rent dissipation process is technological change.  There are always pressures to adopt
fishing-power increasing technology, which only exacerbates the rent dissipation process.  There are reasons to believe
that fishermen might even over-adopt in a situation in which they are scrambling for shares of an uncertain pie.
7 We assume that frozen fish are only consumed after the season closes.  This assumption seems reasonable,
particularly for short seasons.
8 This is an assumption we make for analytical convenience since it allows us to solve for a relatively simpler closer
form solution than would be the case with, for example, fixed holding costs.  Empirically, it may not be too inaccurate
to assume that the most important holding costs are interest costs and deterioration costs, both of which can be depicted
with a simple geometric rate.
9 We assume that the landed to wholesale conversion factor for frozen is k, or the same as for landed to fresh wholesale.
This assumption is not important---but it simplifies the notation.
10 There are several ways to close this model.  One is to assume that there is an exogenously given choke price.  Then
the length of the marketing period T will need to be determined endogenously.  A second way to close the model is to
assume T is given and then allow the final price at that date to be endogenous and determined.  We close the model in
this second manner in this paper since it seems to fit most of the cases we are familiar with better.  Most markets with a
semi-perishable product form (such as frozen) operate on a year to year basis, with the end of the marketing period
coinciding with the new season opening.  In this way inventory holders attempt to sell all of their accumulated
inventories by the start of the new season.  For processed products that are more durable (such as canned) inventories
are carried over.  Carryover complicates the story considerably by linking optimal inventory decisions within the
current marketing period to expectations of all future harvests, etc. (see Homans [15]).
11 The dotted price path below the actual bold joint wholesale price represents the price that wholesalers would be
paying for raw fish destined for the fresh market, if they were buying all of it, at the equilibrium effort level.  Since
they must pay the price frozen wholesalers are paying, the quantity actually destined for the fresh market is less, by the31
                                                                                                                                                                                      
amount entering frozen storage inventories.
12 Note the drop in wholesale prices at the end of the harvest season.  This does not indicate a disequilibrium because
the prices are for different wholesale products.  In the last period of the second phase, wholesalers are paying
a high price for raw fish to sell into the fresh market, but in the next period there is no fresh market and the wholesale
prices clear the frozen market.
13 The interpretation of the modified arbitrage equation in (16) would then be that it represents the switchover date at
 which the shadow value of the last unit added to inventory equals the value of the first unit allocated to the exclusively
 fresh market.
14 It should also be noted that corner solutions are possible.  For example, it would be possible for accumulation to take
place over the entire season.  It would also be possible for parameters to be such as to allow only the fresh market to be
viable.  It is also possible, in principle, to have circumstances in which the shadow price of inventories is always
greater than that for fresh fish, although this would invite some odd arbitrage opportunities whereby fresh fish are
bought and immediately converted to frozen.  For the models we present in this paper, with isoelastic demand curves,
the solution is always interior in the sense that it never pays to devote all the raw product to only one market because
the price in the other market would then approach infinity.
15 The exception to this relative neglect of market analysis is the remarkable study by Crutchfield and Zellner [4]
published in 1962.  Ctuchfield and Zellner devoted several chapters to the workings of the halibut market at the
wholesale and exvessel levels.  They note that, by the 1950s, regional markets like the Seattle market were serving both
a fresh wholesale as well as an inventory market for frozen fish, and that exvessel prices were determined by the
simultaneous operation of both forces.  Other work on the halibut fishery includes Lin et.al. [18] and the recent analysis
by Herrmann[14] which examines the impact of ITQs on the Canadian halibut market.
16 For simplicity, we simulate market growth by increasing the scale constant in the wholesale demand curves.  We
might expect elasticities to change also, although mixing shifts and elasticity changes muddles the overall results.
17 Table 2 has the frozen market growing from a trace level to higher levels, all assuming that the fresh market is still
characterized by the scale given in the last row of Table 1 (namely B=15).32
                                                                                                                                                                                      
18 Note the interesting phenomenon with exvessel prices.  As the frozen market grows, exvessel prices in the initial
period are always bid up.  But exvessel prices in the terminal period fall over some ranges.  This occurs because the
season must be shortened, reducing the period during which the exclusively fresh market can operate.
19 Note that we are focusing explicitly on the lack of attention to the mechanisms linking rent dissipation, regulations,
and markets.  There has been a considerable amount of work, particularly in the last decade or so, estimating retail and
wholesale demand  for fish.  Examples include Saalvanes and DeVoretz [21], Eales et.al. [5], Hardle and Kirman [13],
Gordon et.al. [9], and Graddy [11].   In addition, there has been some work describing the role of the processing sector
in fisheries.  For example, early work by Clark and Munro [3] and Schworm [22] looked at the manner in which
processor market power might mitigate pure open access rent dissipation.  Matulich et.al. [19] and Weninger [26] have
recently modeled wholesale/exvessel linkages in a vertical market chain for fisheries products.  A nice example of an
empirical analysis of  marketing losses associated with sub-optimal regulations in the Whiting fishery is in Larkin and
Sylvia [17].
20 See Casey et. al. [2].